

**00313**

**1962/08/15**

8702112

UNCLASSIFIED

44c

~~TOP SECRET~~  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

This document consists of 1 pages  
No. 1 of 2  
Series A

~~SECRET~~

E BIAS

August 15, 1962

65

MEMORANDUM TO: G - Mr. Johnson  
FROM: ARA - Edwin M. Martin  
SUBJECT: Alternate Course B

There is attached a memorandum which may provide  
useful background information for the meeting tomorrow.

Attachment:

Memorandum dated August 15, 1962.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date: 12/18/52
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART		
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		TS authority to	
FOIA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> C OADR	
PA Exemptions		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> C OADR	

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY: Mick Kaur DATE: 3/10/88  
☐ EXCISE  
☐ DECLASSIFY  
☐ DECLASSIFY IN PART  
☐ DELETE Non-Responsive Info  
 FOIA Exemptions: (b)(1)  
 PA Exemptions: (b)(1)  
 TS authority to:  
☒ CLASSIFY as ☒ S or ☐ C OADR  
☒ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C OADR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUG 1 1962

DEPUTY UNDER  
SECRETARY OF STATE

ARA:RAHurwitch:dr

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

This document consists of \_\_\_\_\_ pages

No. \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_ Copies, Series \_\_\_\_\_

~~TOP SECRET~~ OADR

~~SECRET~~

DATE: August 15, 1962

TO : ARA - Mr. Martin

FROM : ARA - Robert A. Hurwitch *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Observations on Operational Potential with respect  
to Cuba

The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize my impressions gained from discussions in the Operations Group of what we can reasonably expect might be accomplished covertly in Cuba under Course B or any other course which is conditioned upon a comparatively low noise level.

## Propaganda Media

Radio to date has proved of limited value. Short-wave does not reach many people because of shortage of receivers. Medium-wave broadcasting from Swan Island has a small audience, due in part to the low power of the facility. CIA recommends that these broadcasts cease. USIA and we prefer that they continue. None feel that the investment entailed in a more powerful facility would be justified. Enlargement of the Swan Island facility or establishment of a new powerful facility elsewhere would, of course, attract a great deal of attention. The submarine radio will probably improve somewhat, although its approximate 25 mile range is a basic limitation. *(b)(1) (a)(1) DP*

Dissemination of propaganda to Cuba through the open mails is underway and will probably improve, unless the Cuban Government's censorship tightens.

Infiltration of Cubans with some materiel propaganda is accomplished, although the maritime operations appear to be increasingly difficult. I have inquired about the possibility of infiltrating small portable presses for underground publications - CIA says that they are looking into this possibility.

Other means of communication, i.e., dropping propaganda from balloons or aircraft would probably be attributed to the U.S. rather noisily. *(b)(1) (a)(1) CIA*

## Conclusion

Our means of communicating with the Cuban people are limited and will probably remain so.

## Sabotage

The limited state of communications directly affects the success of sabotage operations. Reports indicate that some, apparently

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

very

*(b)(1) (a)(1) + (S)*

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

very limited, nuisance sabotage (sugar in gas tanks, etc.) does occur. Our ability to persuade the Cuban people to engage in more widespread activities of this nature is handicapped by our limited ability to communicate and the difficulty in landing and distributing sabotage materiel, such as plastic explosives, incendiary fountain pens and similar devices. The Agency's reaction to turning such materiel over to exile groups that are known to have organized resistance groups in Cuba (as stated in the NIE) is: whenever a reasonable plan is presented by an exile group, the Agency has provided such assistance and is prepared to continue to do so. A complicating factor appears to be that unless such materiel remains under Agency control until the last minute, its existence in the hands of exiles becomes known to the FBI which then, apparently, becomes unhappy. Further, the Agency is fearful that supplying materiel to selected exile groups in blanket fashion and not based on exile plans which the Agency approves, may result in the sabotage of major installations, thereby raising the noise level considerably above that which the Agency understands to be desirable, since the U.S. would be charged by the Cuban and Bloc Governments with complicity and responsibility.

Conclusion:

(b)(1)  
(4)(4)+(5)  
A significant amount of sabotage in Cuba during the next year appears unlikely, unless approval is given for the destruction of major installations by carefully selected and trained Cuban teams infiltrated for such purpose and for the noise level to be raised substantially.

Air and Sea Support of Infiltrated Teams

While maritime means, including the use of submarines if necessary, would continue to be the primary means of infiltration/exfiltration/re-supply, occasions may arise where re-supply can only be accomplished effectively by air and with U.S. citizen crews. Teams that have moved inland may find that only with considerable danger can they reach the coast again for re-supply. Agency experience with Cuban pilots on air re-supply missions has not been good (they are not accurate) and U.S. citizen personnel may have to be used.

ARA:RAHurwitch:dr

TOP SECRET